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Strategies to Combat Internet Sales of Counterfeit
Goods
Daniel C.K. Chow*
The proliferation of counterfeits for sale on e-commerce sites has
created new and more dangerous challenges to brand owners than
counterfeits sold through brick and mortar establishments. Most brand
owners are currently focusing their efforts on simplifying and
streamlining Notice and Takedown (“NTD”) procedures set up by ecommerce platforms to remove illegal listings. The shortcomings of these
efforts are that NTDs do not directly reach the counterfeiter who remains
free to conduct its illegal activities with impunity and that NTDs do not
prevent delisted counterfeiters from reappearing in short order under a
new fictitious name and identity.
Brand owners should seek to induce China to rigorously enforce its
recently enacted Electronic Commerce Law (“ECL”), which was designed
by China’s lawmakers to create a “choke point” that excludes
counterfeiters and other unscrupulous merchants from gaining access to
online accounts. The ECL requires multiple layers of government review
and approval that were designed so that they can be satisfied only by
legitimate and economically viable business entities. To date, e-commerce
sites in China do not strictly comply with the ECL, and U.S.-based ecommerce sites do not require any compliance whatsoever with the ECL.
Rigorous enforcement of the ECL should result in preventing
counterfeiters from gaining access to e-commerce sites based in China and
the United States and should lead to a decrease in sales of counterfeits on
the internet.

* B.A., J.D. Yale University; Bazler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Michael E.
Moritz College of Law. Thanks to Matt Cooper, Moritz Reference Librarian, for his
assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although counterfeiting had already emerged as a major business
problem for multinational companies (“MNCs”) in the 1990s, the advent
of the new millennium brought a new and more dangerous challenge for
MNCs as sales of counterfeit goods began to proliferate rapidly on the
internet.1 According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) has exacerbated an already
massive counterfeiting problem:
For counterfeiters, production costs are low, millions of
potential customers are available online, transactions are
convenient, and listing goods on well-known platforms
provides an air of legitimacy. When sellers of illicit goods are
in another country, they are also exposed to relatively little
risk of criminal prosecution or civil liability under current law
enforcement and regulatory practices.2
A recent U.S. General Accounting Office study found that of forty-seven
items purchased online, twenty were counterfeit while twenty-seven
1 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED
GOODS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/20_0124_plcy_counterfeit-pirated-goodsreport_01.pdf [hereinafter COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS].
2 Id. at 20.
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were genuine.3 Another study in 2021 found that four out of five smalland medium-sized businesses worldwide are victims of counterfeiting
on the internet.4 While these statistics present a daunting concern, the
problem must be traced to its source to further understand
counterfeiting on the internet and the new challenges that it poses.
Counterfeiting is now the largest criminal enterprise in the world
and the epicenter of counterfeiting is in the People’s Republic of China
(“PRC” or China).5 Counterfeiting in China first emerged as a major
business problem for MNCs at the beginning of the new millennium, and
it continues to persist today despite all of the intensive efforts of MNCs
to combat the problem in the past two decades.6 A recent study found
that China produces 80 percent of the world’s counterfeits, and that
global counterfeiting is now a $1.7 trillion dollar industry, which is

3 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-216, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: AGENCIES CAN
IMPROVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS RISKS POSED BY CHANGING COUNTERFEITS MARKET 15 (2018). The
purchases were in categories of frequently counterfeited goods: sneakers, mugs,
cosmetics, and phone chargers. A recent report from China found that more than 40
percent of all goods sold online through Chinese e-commerce platforms were
“counterfeits or of bad quality.” More than 40 Percent of China’s Online Sales ‘Counterfeits
or Bad Quality,’ TELEGRAPH (Nov. 3, 2015, 1:01 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/asia/china/11971401/More-than-40-per-cent-of-Chinas-onlinesales-counterfeit-or-bad-quality.html.
4 Four out of Every Five SMBs Are Victims of Counterfeiting on the Internet, CISION
PRNEWSIRE (Apr. 26, 2021, 3:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
four-out-of-every-five-smbs-are-victims-of-counterfeiting-on-the-internet301275246.html.
5 Wade Shepard, Meet the Man Fighting America’s Trade War Against Chinese
Counterfeits (It’s Not Trump), FORBES (Mar. 29, 2018, 3:52 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2018/03/29/meet-the-man-fighting-americastrade-war-against-chinese-counterfeits/?sh=594537d01c0d;
Elizabeth
Schultze,
Counterfeit Goods from China Are Crushing American Small Businesses – and They’re
Calling on Trump to Fight Back, CNBC (Feb. 29, 2020, 9:16 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/02/28/small-businesses-are-pushing-trump-to-fight-chinese-counterfeits.html
(“‘The epicenter, ground zero, of manufactured counterfeit goods is China,’ said Bob
Barchiesi, president of the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition.”).
6 Counterfeiting as a major business problem for brand owners first gained
international notoriety at the beginning of the new millennium. See generally Daniel C.K.
Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2000). China
was in the early stages of its economic ascent and far from the economic power that it is
today. Many observers, including this Author, believed that China would steadily move
up the ranks of the leading economies in the world and that the counterfeiting problem
would begin to subside. Only the first part of this prediction proved to be accurate;
counterfeiting remains rampant in China. For a discussion of the first studies examining
the new challenges posed by sales of counterfeits on the internet, see ORGANISATION FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 14 (2007), https://www.oecd.org/sti/38707619.pdf.
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expected to reach $2.8 trillion in 2022.7 Not surprisingly, China is
considered the source of most of the counterfeits found on internet sites,
such as China-based Alibaba. Currently, Alibaba is the world’s largest ecommerce platform with approximately 1.24 billion active users,
including 953 million users in China and 285 million consumers
abroad.8 After U.S.-based Amazon—the world’s second largest ecommerce platform—decided in 2015 to woo Chinese manufacturers to
sell directly on its sites, counterfeits for sale on Amazon increased
rapidly, leading to accusations that Amazon’s efforts are “killing small
American businesses.”9
Brand owners find that counterfeiters who are able to transcend
the physical limitations of brick and mortar operations by selling on the
internet present even greater and more frustrating challenges than
traditional counterfeiters.10 Brand owners who believe that ecommerce platforms are not doing enough to combat counterfeiting on
the internet find that liability by the e-commerce platform is strictly
circumscribed.11 In 2010, the leading Second Circuit case of Tiffany (NJ)
Inc. v. eBay Inc. established the current legal framework for liability for
trademark infringement by e-commerce platforms.12 Tiffany held that
e-commerce platforms are not liable for direct trademark infringement
by third party online vendors of counterfeits but may be liable for
7 Shepard, supra note 5. The U.S. General Accountability Office reports that in 2016,
88 percent of all seized counterfeit goods by the United States originated from China and
Hong Kong. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 3; OECD & EUR. UNION
INTELL. PROP. OFF. [EUIPO] (2016), TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS: MAPPING THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT 81 (2016), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/97892642526
53-en.pdf?expires=1576509401&id=id&accname=id5723&checksum=576BF246D4E5
0234EAF5E8EDF7F08147 (“[C]ounterfeit and pirated products can originate from
virtually all economies . . ., with China appearing as the single largest producing
economy . . . .”).
8 Company Overview, ALIBABA GROUP, https://www.alibabagroup.com/en/about/
overview#:~:text=Annual%20active%20consumers%20of%20the,and%20285%20mi
llion%20consumers%20overseas (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
9 Wade Shepard, How Amazon’s Wooing of Chinese Sellers Is Killing Small American
Businesses, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2017, 11:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wade
shepard/2017/02/14/how-amazons-wooing-of-chinese-sellers-is-hurting-americaninnovation/?sh=358fc0d61df2.
10 COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS, supra note 1, at 20. Traditional
counterfeiters are always at risk of capture and arrest, but online counterfeiters are not.
See infra Section III.A.
11 For an overview of limitations for secondary liability, see U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., SECONDARY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY IN THE E-COMMERCE SETTING 2–4 (2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Secondary-TM-InfringementLiability-Response.pdf.
12 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
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contributory trademark infringement if they facilitate sales of
counterfeits by online merchants with knowledge or reason to know of
the counterfeits.13 Tiffany further held, however, that an e-commerce
platform that removes an infringing listing after notification submitted
under a Notice and Takedown (“NTD”) procedure enjoys the protection
of a safe harbor free from any liability.14 Since Tiffany, brand owners
have channeled their efforts into streamlining and simplifying NTDs.15
This Article argues, however, that an approach focusing on
improving NTDs has serious shortcomings. First, this approach is
directed at the e-commerce platform and does not directly reach the
counterfeiter who is able to continue its illegal activities with
impunity.16 Second, even when an infringing listing is removed, the
counterfeiter is able to resurface in short order under a new false name
and identity.17 As this Article will explain, one of the glaring weaknesses
of the current e-commerce regime is that counterfeiters are able to use
totally fictitious information to create accounts with e-commerce
platforms.18
A more fruitful approach that brand owners have heretofore
apparently overlooked would be the use of tools to combat internet
counterfeiting provided by China’s lawmakers. The recently enacted
Electronic Commerce Law (“ECL”) and related legislation were designed
by PRC lawmakers to exclude counterfeiters and other unscrupulous
entities from selling on the internet.19 The ECL, together with other PRC
laws, requires online business operators to undergo multiple layers of
official review and approval by PRC government authorities.20 The ECL
and related laws were developed so that only lawful and economically
viable business entities can meet all of the ECL’s requirements.21 This
Article details the various stages of review and approvals by relevant
PRC authorities and demonstrates how these levels of review are
designed to exclude counterfeiters and other miscreants from operating
Id. at 103–07.
Id. at 106.
15 See infra Section III.B.
16 See infra Section III.B.
17 See infra Section III.B.
18 See infra Section III.B.
19 PRC Electronic Commerce Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 31, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019); Regulation of the People’s Republic of China
on the Administration of the Registration of Enterprise Legal Persons (promulgated by
State Council, Mar. 2, 2019, effective Mar. 2, 2019).
20 See infra Sections IV.A–C.
21 See infra Sections IV.A–C.
13
14
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on e-commerce sites.22 This Article will explain how U.S. brand owners
can use the ECL to their advantage to deter counterfeiters and to
proceed directly against counterfeiters without having to rely solely on
NTDs, which can be cumbersome, time consuming, costly, and
ineffective.23
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the new
challenges created by internet sales of counterfeits. Part III examines
the current liability regime for counterfeits sold on the internet
established by the Second Circuit in Tiffany. Part IV analyzes the ECL
and related PRC laws and explains how they can be used to deter and
detect counterfeiters in China who seek to sell their illegal goods on the
internet. Part V concludes with some suggested steps for the future for
U.S. brand owners.
II. NEW CHALLENGES CREATED BY INTERNET SALES OF COUNTERFEITS
A. Traditional Means of Detecting Counterfeiting
The use of e-commerce to sell counterfeits creates new and more
dangerous challenges to MNCs and other brand owners. Historically,
consumers could rely on two major indicators that goods being sold
through brick and mortar operations were counterfeit. First, the
location of the counterfeit sales establishment was a telling indication.24
In China, as in many countries, counterfeits cannot be found in large
state-owned department stores or MNC retail outlets, such as Costco or
Walmart.25 Rather, buyers of counterfeits must travel to side streets and
back alleys in less desirable locations or to wholesale markets outside
of most urban areas to buy counterfeits.26 In the United States, the same
dynamic holds true. No reputable retail business, such as major
supermarkets, department stores, or the “Big Box” stores sell
counterfeits.27 This is because in the United States, as in China, major
retailers have an established distribution network of qualified and
vetted distributors that deal only in genuine goods.28 In China, as in the
United States, it is difficult for a counterfeiter to penetrate an
established distribution network to inject counterfeits into the stream
See infra Sections IV.A–C.
See infra Sections IV.A–C.
24 COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS, supra note 1, at 14.
25 Daniel C.K. Chow, Alibaba, Amazon, and Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet,
40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 157, 163 (2020).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
22
23
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of commerce.29 Rather, the counterfeiter is relegated to secondary
distribution channels that sell to mom-and-pop operators or less
reputable retailers in less desirable locations.30 Second, the price of the
products is also a reliable indicator of whether a product is a
counterfeit.31 Counterfeits are rarely, if ever, sold at the full retail price
of the genuine product.32 Most counterfeits are sold at substantially
lower prices than the genuine product33 and low quality counterfeits are
often sold at a fraction of the price of the genuine product.34 Using these
two indicators, location and price, a consumer has a reliable method to
determine whether a good sold through brick and mortar operations are
counterfeit or genuine.
The rise of e-commerce has now allowed counterfeiters to evade
the use of these methods to detect counterfeits. Consumers from
anywhere in the world can now purchase counterfeits from the comfort
of their home or office using a computer, mobile phone, or other
electronic device.35 Counterfeiters can post images of the genuine
product while selling counterfeits, and charge prices that are identical,
or close to, the retail price of the genuine article.36 The traditional
methods of detecting counterfeits have been rendered ineffective by the
rise of e-commerce.
The rise of e-commerce also creates another major advantage for
counterfeiters. Most counterfeiters depend upon subterfuge, artifice,
and disguise to evade detection and capture.37 When counterfeiters
Id.
Id.
31 COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS, supra note 1, at 14.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.; see also Elise Trecul, How Cheap Does a Counterfeit Have to Be to Steal Your
Sale, RED POINTS, https://www.redpoints.com/blog/cheap-counterfeits-steal-sales/
(noting that to take sales away from the genuine product, the “sweet spot” for
counterfeits is 50 percent of the retail price of the genuine product) (last visited Feb. 25,
2022).
35 See Chow, Alibaba, Amazon, and Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, supra
note 25, at 192.
36 COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS, supra note 1, at 22.
37 Daniel C.K. Chow, Barriers to Criminal Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in
China, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 9–10) (manuscript on
file with the Seton Hall Law Review). Brand owners find it necessary to hire private
investigation companies to track down counterfeiters who operate clandestinely. Brand
owners also outsource investigation because it can be dangerous. Private investigators
add to the expense of the brand owner. See id. at 10. Brand owners bemoan that they
suffer losses from the counterfeiter and then also have to incur the considerable expense
of tracking down counterfeiters, a double loss.
29
30
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were limited to the use of brick and mortar operations, brand owners
could identify, capture, and arrest counterfeiters through the use of
enforcement operations directed at those physical locations.38 In China,
brand owners used administrative entities to conduct surprise raids and
seizures.39 The brand owner would appear at the local branch of the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce (now renamed the
State Administration of Market Regulation), usually along with private
investigators in tow, and present a copy of its trademark certificate and
a statement that a suspected counterfeiter is infringing upon the
trademark.40 As time is of the essence because of tip-offs, the
enforcement authorities need to act immediately.
Often the
enforcement authorities and the brand owner would leave half an hour
after the filing of the complaint in government vans headed to the
location of the counterfeiter.41 The location of the counterfeiter is not
revealed until the government vehicles are en route to avoid tip-offs.42
The authorities then conduct a surprise raid and seize any illegal
products, equipment, and cash on site and detain any persons found at
the location.43
The detention of any counterfeiters found on the premises allows
the authorities and the brand owner to identify the person(s) involved
and to subject these persons to sanctions in the form of administrative
fines and, in some cases, criminal prosecution.44 Criminal prosecution
and punishment,45 when available, operate as effective deterrents to
future criminal activity as China’s criminal punishment system is
notorious for its harsh conditions.46 Persons can be arrested and locked

Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10–11.
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Chow, Barriers to Criminal Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in China, supra note
37, at 3, 10.
44 Id. at 2–3.
45 The sale of counterfeit goods is subject to criminal liability if certain economic
thresholds are met. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, and amended most recently on
Nov. 4, 2017), art. 214. China is required to have criminal penalties for willful
counterfeiting. World Trade Organization Agreement of Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights, art. 61, Apr. 15, 1994.
46 See Chow, Barriers to Criminal Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in China, supra
note 37, at 15–18 (discussing how the Public Security Bureau, China’s Police, is one of
the most feared and most powerful entities in the PRC government).
38
39
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up in punitive conditions for many months before a case is prosecuted.47
The notorious reputation of China’s criminal punishment system is
alone a deterrent to many offenders.
B. How the Internet Facilitates Evasion by Counterfeiters
The use of the internet now allows counterfeiters to easily evade
detection and capture. Many counterfeiters use false names, identities,
and addresses when opening an online account.48 For example, brand
owners report that it is possible to use entirely fictitious information in
setting up an account with Amazon.49 E-commerce platforms vary
greatly in the amount and nature of the information required to
establish an online account, and counterfeiters do not have any difficulty
in circumventing these requirements.50 Alibaba is known to be careless
in enforcing its identification requirements, allowing counterfeiters to
submit false information.51 The ease with which counterfeiters can use
fictitious identities and locations means that counterfeiters can
disappear into the vastness of cyberspace at the first sign of trouble only
to reappear under a new fictitious identity and location in short order.52
The rise of e-commerce has allowed counterfeiters to overcome
three of the most serious barriers to the further penetration of
counterfeit goods into the stream of commerce. First, counterfeiters no
longer struggle to sell their goods in legitimate distribution channels;
the internet is a new and universal legitimate distribution channel that
reaches nearly every consumer in the world and is available to genuine
and counterfeit goods alike. Second, counterfeiters no longer have to
charge lower prices for their goods; they can charge prices that are
identical or similar to prices for genuine products.
Finally,
counterfeiters have no fear of detection and capture on e-commerce
sites. The internet has allowed counterfeiters to overcome the
traditional problems that created limitations and imposed threats on
counterfeiting.

47 Id. at 17 (explaining how the Public Security Bureau can detain persons for over
eight months without ever charging them with a crime).
48 See infra Section III.B.
49 See Chow, Barriers to Criminal Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in China, supra
note 37, at 19–20.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 15.
52 Id. at 20.
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III. LIABILITY OF E-COMMERCE SITES FOR SALES OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS
A. The Framework Established by the Second Circuit in Tiffany
In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,53 decided in 2010, the Second Circuit
established the liability regime for e-commerce platforms for the sale of
counterfeit goods.54 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. and Tiffany Company (together
“Tiffany”) brought a lawsuit against eBay, the proprietor of an internetbased marketplace that sells goods through an auction system, for direct
and contributory trademark infringement and other claims.55 Tiffany is
in the business of selling a high-end brand of jewelry.56 Tiffany found
that third party merchants were using eBay’s website to sell counterfeit
Tiffany merchandise.57
To deal with counterfeits, eBay implemented and administered a
notice and take-down system that allowed brand owners to alert eBay
of listings that infringed intellectual property rights.58
Upon
notification, eBay would remove such listings.59 eBay expeditiously
removed such listings after receiving the notifications, including those
from Tiffany, often within twenty-four hours or less.60 eBay also
administered a “three strikes” policy that resulted in a merchant’s
online account being suspended if the merchant infringed intellectual
property rights on three occasions.61 As part of its promotional
activities, eBay also actively advertised and promoted premium brand
jewelry products offered for sale on its websites, including Tiffany
merchandise.62
Tiffany argued that eBay’s conduct of facilitating and advertising
the sale of Tiffany branded goods, many of which turned out to be
counterfeit, constituted both direct and indirect (otherwise known as

See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 105–07.
55 Id. at 96–97, 101, 103.
56 Id. at 96.
57 Id. at 97.
58 Id. at 99. NTDs were first established as a safe harbor in the context of copyright
by Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 17 U.S.C. § 512(g). The
DMCA does not apply directly to trademarks, but the NTD model created by the DMCA
has been widely adopted by e-commerce sites to also apply to trademark counterfeiting.
Tiffany holds that NTDs also provide a safe harbor for trademark infringements. Id. at
106.
59 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 99.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 100.
62 Id. at 101.
53
54
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secondary or contributory) infringement of Tiffany’s trademarks.63
Tiffany subsequently filed a lawsuit in federal district court in the
Southern District of New York.64 The district court ruled in favor of eBay
on the trademark infringement issues.65
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court.66 The Second Circuit
first held that eBay was not directly liable for trademark infringement.67
To recover for direct trademark infringement, the owner of a trademark
registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office must prove that a
person or entity used the trademark without the owner’s consent in
violation of Section 32 of the Lanham Act.68 Under the Lanham Act,
Tiffany would have to show that eBay, not the third party merchants,
used Tiffany’s trademarks without its permission. Although eBay did
use Tiffany’s trademarks without Tiffany’s permission, the Second
Circuit found that eBay’s use was a nominative fair use because eBay
used the Tiffany trademarks to describe and identify the goods as those
of Tiffany, the brand owner, rather than to mislead and confuse
consumers, and thus the use was lawful.69

Id. at 101.
Id. at 96.
65 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 101.
66 Id. at 114.
67 Id. at 103.
68 Section 32 of the Lanham Act states in relevant part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant- (a) use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
69 See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103. A more complete statement of the doctrine of
nominative fair use is that it allows “[a] defendant [to] use a plaintiff’s trademark to
identify the plaintiff’s goods so long as there is no likelihood of confusion about the
source of [the] defendant’s product or the mark-holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.”
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
The doctrine of nominative fair use is often involved in comparative advertising. For
example, suppose that Brand A Cola airs a television commercial with the slogan, “In a
blind taste test, most consumers prefer the taste of Brand A Cola to the taste of Brand B
Cola.” The use by Brand A of the Brand B Cola trademark is done without the permission
of the company that owns the Brand B trademark, but the use is permitted as a
nominative fair use. The rationale is that the product (i.e., Brand B Cola) is not readily
identifiable without the use of the trademark, and Brand A has done nothing to suggest
that the Brand B has sponsored or endorsed the advertisement. Cf. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at
101.
63
64
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On the issue of indirect or secondary trademark infringement by
an e-commerce platform, the Second Circuit noted that this was an issue
of first impression.70 The U.S. Supreme Court first applied the common
law doctrine of contributory liability for trademark infringement to
manufacturers and distributors of products in 1982’s Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.71 In Tiffany, the Second Circuit
extended the holding of Inwood for the first time to an online
marketplace.72 The Court of Appeals found that e-commerce platforms
could be held liable for contributory trademark infringement “for
culpably facilitating the infringing conduct of the counterfeiting
vendors.”73 The Second Circuit elaborated:
[T]here are two ways in which a [service provider] may
become contributorily liable for the infringing conduct of
another: first, if the service provider “intentionally induces
another to infringe a trademark,” and second, if the service
provider “continues to supply its [service] to one whom it
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement.”74
Tiffany argued that eBay was liable under the second test for
contributory infringement75 and argued that eBay continued to supply
its services to merchants of counterfeit Tiffany merchandise while
knowing, or having reason to know, that the merchants were infringing
Tiffany’s trademarks.76
With respect to listings by merchants that were specifically flagged
by Tiffany to eBay and later removed, the district court held, and the
Second Circuit agreed, that eBay had no liability.77 On appeal, Tiffany
did not contest this ruling.78 Tiffany argued, however, that eBay’s
general knowledge of ubiquitous Tiffany counterfeits for sale on its
website, combined with eBay’s continued service to merchants of
counterfeits, created secondary liability:
Tiffany argued in the district court that eBay knew, or at least
had reason to know, that counterfeit Tiffany goods were being
sold ubiquitously on its website. As evidence, it pointed to,
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103.
Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982).
See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 105–06.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 106 (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106.
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inter alia, the demand letters it sent to eBay in 2003 and 2004,
the results of its Buying Programs that it shared with eBay, the
thousands of [notices] it filed with eBay alleging its good faith
belief that certain listings were counterfeit, and the various
complaints eBay received from buyers claiming that they had
purchased one or more counterfeit Tiffany items through
eBay’s website. Tiffany argued that taken together, this
evidence established eBay’s knowledge of the widespread sale
of counterfeit Tiffany products on its website. Tiffany urged
that eBay be held contributorially [sic] liable on the basis that
despite that knowledge, it continued to make its services
available to infringing sellers.79
The Second Circuit rejected this argument.80 The Court held that a
generalized knowledge or a reason to know of general trademark
infringement on eBay’s sites was insufficient to establish eBay’s
contributory negligence.81 The Court found that liability can only attach
to particular knowledge of specific listings that are infringing or will
infringe in the future.82 Further, eBay was protected from liability when
it removed the illegal listings after notification by the brand owner.83
Tiffany established the liability framework under which most
brand owners now deal with counterfeit products sold on e-commerce
platforms. Following this case, no general claims that counterfeits are
found in any quantity, even if they are ubiquitous, on a website will lead
to secondary liability. Websites like eBay have no general duty to police
or monitor their sites for counterfeits and will not be held liable for
failing to do so when Tiffany squarely places the burden of monitoring
and detecting listings for counterfeit goods on the brand owner.
Only a claim that a particular listing sells counterfeits may result in
liability.84 If the e-commerce platform has set up a notice and take-down
procedure and then removes the listing after the plaintiff has submitted
a satisfactory notice, Tiffany establishes that the e-commerce site enjoys
a safe harbor free from any secondary liability.85

79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id. at 107–09.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107.
Id. at 106–09.
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B. Brand Owners’ Efforts After Tiffany
After Tiffany, brand owners have focused their efforts on using,
improving, and streamlining NTDs.86 Brand owners have found that
they encounter two different sets of problems when using NTDs as
further explained below.
The first set of problems deals with what brand owners suspect are
conflicts of interest on the part of e-commerce platforms that has
resulted in half-hearted efforts to remove offending listings. Ecommerce sites, such as eBay, earn revenue from sales of products,
including counterfeit products.87 Some brand owners believe that this
economic incentive to make sales leads some e-commerce sites to
tolerate the sale of counterfeit products and to be lax in policing their
sites for them.88 Brand owners have made these accusations against
popular e-commerce platforms such as Amazon,89 but have singled out
Alibaba’s conduct as particularly egregious,90 leading the U.S.
government to place Alibaba on the Notorious Markets blacklist in

86 Jeff Bercovici, Small Businesses Say Amazon Has a Huge Counterfeiting Problem.
This ‘Shark Tank’ Company Is Fighting Back, INC. (Apr. 2019), https://www.inc.com/
magazine/201904/jeff-bercovici/amazon-fake-copycat-knockoff-products-smallbusiness.html.
87 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 97.
88 See Gillian Wong, Alibaba Disputes U.S. Group’s Claim that It Tolerates Fake Goods
on Taobao, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2015, 1:23 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/alibabarebuts-u-s-groups-claim-it-tolerates-fake-goods-on-taobao-1428981233.
89 William Mauldin & Alex Leary, U.S. Tags Amazon Sites as ‘Notorious Markets,’ WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-puts-amazonforeign-websites-on-list-of-platforms-blamed-for-facilitating-piracy-11588172453
(U.S. accuses Amazon of tolerating counterfeits on its online platforms in foreign
countries); see also David Pierson, Extra Inventory. More Sales. Lower Prices. How
Counterfeits Benefit Amazon, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-amazon-counterfeits-20180928story.html (“Not only has [Amazon] avoided any serious backlash for allowing the sale
of fake goods, it’s actually thrived from it, say more than two dozen brand owners, ecommerce consultants, attorneys, investigators and public policy experts.”).
90 Michael Schuman, A Small Table Maker Takes on Alibaba’s Flood of Fakes, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/business/alibaba-fakemerchandise-e-commerce.html (discussing the suspicions of many U.S. business that
Alibaba tolerates counterfeits on its sites with one business owner stating, “[i]t just
keeps going and going and going . . . . It’s like trying to pick weeds on a 70-acre farm”).
One brand owner stated, “Alibaba’s strategy has consistently been to provide lip service
to supporting brand enforcement efforts, while doing as little as possible to impede the
massive flow of counterfeit merchandise on its platforms.” Letter from Lee S. Sporn,
Senior Vice President, Bus. Affs., Michael Kors (USA), Inc., to Bob Barchiesi, President
Int’l Anti-Counterfeiting Coal. (IACC), (Oct. 26, 2016), at 2.
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2011,91 2014,92 and each year from 2016-2020.93 Brand owners can
point to comments made in 2015 by Jack Ma, Alibaba’s outspoken
founder, as indicating a tolerance for the sale of counterfeits. In a speech
at Alibaba’s headquarters, Ma discussed the prevalence of counterfeits
on the internet:
The problem is the fake products today are of better quality
and better price than the real names. They are exactly the
[same] factories, exactly the same raw materials but they do
not use the names.94
Ma gave this speech to his assembled staff while he was still Alibaba’s
chief executive. One could have only concluded Ma believed
counterfeits are superior to genuine goods and that he was endorsing
their sale and consumption. Ma’s comments ignited a firestorm of
outrage among brand owners, leading one to label Alibaba as “our most
dangerous and damaging adversary.”95
In response to angry
denunciations by brand owners, Ma subsequently walked back these

91 The United States has repeatedly placed Alibaba on blacklists. Alibaba was first
placed on the Out-of-Cycle Notorious Markets List in 2011. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2011 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 3 (Dec. 20, 2011),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/gsp/speeches/reports/2011/Notorious
%20Markets%20List%20FINAL.pdf (discussing Alibaba’s subsidiary site Taobao.com).
92 OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 OUT-OF-CYCLE NOTORIOUS MARKETS 8 (2015)
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20Notorious%20Markets%20List%20%20Published_0.pdf (discussing Alibaba’s subsidiary site Taobao.com).
93 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS
MARKETS 12 (2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-Out-of-Cycle-ReviewNotorious-Markets.pdf (Alibaba’s subsidiary site Taobao.com; 2020 is the most current
year for which statistics are available); OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 OUTOF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 20 (2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
files/Press/Reports/2017%20Notorious%20Markets%20List%201.11.18.pdf
(Taobao.com); OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF
NOTORIOUS MARKETS 26 (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018_Notorious_
Markets_List.pdf (Taobao.com); OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2019 OUT-OF-CYCLE
REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 28 (2019), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_
Review_of_Notorious_Markets_for_Counterfeiting_and_Piracy.pdf (Taobao.com); OFF. OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2020 REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS FOR COUNTERFEITING AND
PIRACY 31 (2020), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2020%20
Review%20of%20Notorious%20Markets%20for%20Counterfeiting%20and%20Pirac
y%20(final).pdf (Taobao.com).
94 Charles Clover, Alibaba’s Jack Ma Says Fakes Are Better than Originals, FIN. TIMES
(June 14, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6700d5cc-3209-11e6-ad39-3fee5ff
e5b5b.
95 Eva Dou, Jack Ma Says Fakes “Better Quality and Better Price than the Real Names,”
WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2016, 3:06 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-29327.
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remarks, but industry suspicions of Alibaba remain high.96 For example,
one study in September 2020 found that Alibaba’s sites use algorithms
that promote counterfeit goods.97
The second set of problems relates to the use of NTDs. Brand
owners claim these procedures can be cumbersome, labyrinthine, and
time consuming.98 Completing some of these procedures can take
months and can be costly.99 For example, one NTD requires brand
owners to place an order for the counterfeit goods, buy and receive the
goods, test and verify that the goods are counterfeit, and then submit
both the counterfeit and genuine goods with notices documenting these
actions.100 Even if the brand owner spends the time and effort to
successfully use the NTD, the notice will only result in a removal of the
specific offending listing. On most e-commerce sites, the merchant
enjoys a “three strikes” policy, i.e., the merchant’s online account is
closed only after the merchant is caught three different times using an
illegal listing.101 As one brand owner lamented, using Alibaba’s
reporting system “can become expensive, . . . can become frustrating,
[and] . . . can take time away from your sales, marketing and other
creative endeavors.”102 Brand owners also complain that even after
complying with the time-consuming procedure, it can still lead to
frustration for the brand owner due to the overwhelming scale of the

96 Ma subsequently walked back these remarks, stating, “‘Every fake product we sell,
we are losing five customers’ . . . . ‘We are the victims of that. We never stop fighting.’”
Id. Ma also boasted that Alibaba was “the world’s ‘leading fighter of the counterfeits.’”
Id. Despite Ma’s assertions, Taobao.com, the e-commerce site of an Alibaba subsidiary,
has been on the U.S. government’s blacklist of notorious markets for the past five
consecutive years. See supra note 93.
97 Yaling Jiang, Are Luxury Brands Losing the Battle Against Alibaba’s Counterfeiters,
JING DAILY (Sept. 6, 2000), https://jingdaily.com/are-luxury-brands-losing-the-battleagainst-alibabas-counterfeiters/ (The Jing Daily article does not claim that the use of the
algorithm to promote counterfeits is intentional and notes that Alibaba is making many
efforts to scrub clean its dubious reputation.).
98 Bercovici, supra note 86.
99 Jiang, supra note 97.
100 See Bercovici, supra note 86.
101 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing eBay’s
three strikes policy). A three strikes approach is common among e-commerce sites. For
Alibaba’s three strikes policy, see ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
INFRINGEMENTS ON ALIBABA.COM, https://rule.alibaba.com/rule/detail/2043.html (last
visited Feb. 27, 2022). Amazon has rejected a three strikes policy. Angela He et al.,
Amazon’s Anti-Counterfeit Effort Falls Short (Sept. 11, 2020, 4:27 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1307710/amazon-s-anti-counterfeit-efforts-fallshort.
102 Schuman, supra note 90.
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problem.103 Brand owners have summed up their experiences with the
use of Amazon’s NTDs as “a horror story”104 and compared their use as
being imprisoned in “Amazon purgatory.”105
The response by brand owners to these obstacles posed by some
NTDs has been to lobby e-commerce sites to simplify and streamline
NTDs.106 The basic goal of these efforts is to reduce the burdens for
brand owners of both the time and cost investments in complying with
NTDs. This approach, however, suffers from serious shortcomings.
First, the approach deals only with the listing on the e-commerce
platform and does not address or reach the underlying problem of the
merchant of counterfeit goods. The counterfeiter remains beyond the
reach of the brand owner and the law and can continue its illegal
activities with impunity even if its listing is removed. The counterfeit
goods can find other channels to enter the stream of commerce and
inflict harm on the brand owner. The brand owner is also relying
entirely on the e-commerce site, even though brand owners have
consistently expressed suspicions that e-commerce sites tolerate
counterfeits because their sales also generate revenue.107 Second, even
if the brand owner succeeds in permanently barring a merchant under
a “three strikes” policy, nothing prevents the counterfeiter from
reappearing in short order on the same site under a new name, identity,
and address.108 Some brand owners refer to this process as a futile game
of “Whac-A-Mole,” in which the only result after a significant
expenditure of time, money, and effort is that the counterfeiter simply
creates a new virtual identity and is back in business quickly with little
effort or expense.109 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security
highlighted this problem in a recent study of online counterfeiting:
Commenters also noted several disparities across e-commerce platforms. For example, among third-party marketplaces that control who may list products on their site for sale,
103 Id. (“Although those [complaints filed with Alibaba] were successful, [the brand
owner] quickly realized that the scale of the problem and the paperwork Alibaba
required were too much for her to handle as a one-person business.”).
104 Bercovici, supra note 86.
105 Id. (“As horror stories go, the experience of trying to survive in Amazon’s world is
more Kafka than Lovecraft. Any reader of The Trial would recognize the labyrinthine
bureaucracy, arbitrary rulings, and absurd contradictions, all under the weight of a
faceless looming authority.”).
106 Id.
107 See Clover, supra note 94.
108 Pierson, supra note 89 (noting that if “Amazon shutters one store for selling
knockoffs, the owner often shifts operations to another”).
109 Id.
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some scrutinize their sellers much more than others. Some
allow anyone to sell a product if they provide basic information about themselves, such as credit card and tax identity
information. Others require more detailed information, such
as an existing online presence, proof that the seller is a business entity and not an individual, and that the seller has established customer support. . . . A key underlying problem here
is that on at least some e-commerce platforms, little identifying information is necessary for a counterfeiter to begin selling.110
Not only can the listing be posted using false information, but the
counterfeiter can also process payments anonymously:
Counterfeiters have the ability to remain anonymous as virtually every aspect of the sales process can be performed using
false or incomplete names. . . . Some online marketplaces are
often lax in verifying that sellers are using valid contact details, and are hesitant to share this information with brand
owners.111
E-commerce platforms may have an incentive to create identification
requirements that are not onerous and difficult to satisfy because it
would lead to more sellers on their sites, a greater volume of sales, and
more revenue for the e-commerce platform. The problem with this
approach is that it allows counterfeiters to get easy access to the ecommerce platform.
Clever counterfeiters in China find it easy to circumvent these
listing requirements.112 Providing false identifying information is an
easy feat.113 Even the more stringent requirements of some e-commerce
platforms, such as requiring more detailed information about whether
an entity is a business or an individual or whether the seller has
customer support, can be easily fabricated by counterfeiters.114 For
example, brand owners who recently attempted to pursue
counterfeiters on Amazon found that almost all of the sellers used false
names and fictitious addresses in setting up their Amazon seller

COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS, supra note 1, at 22, 25.
INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, ADDRESSING THE SALE OF COUNTERFEITS ON THE INTERNET 7
(2017), https://www.inta.org/wp-content/uploads/public-files/advocacy/committeereports/Addressing_the_Sale_of_Counterfeits_on_the_Internet_021518.pdf.
112 Alana Semuels, Amazon May Have a Counterfeit Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/04/amazon-may-have-acounterfeit-problem/558482/.
113 Id.
114 See id.
110
111
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accounts.115 As one brand representative stated, “[t]he real problem is
that it’s possible to set up an Amazon account using totally fictitious
information.”116
The ease with which counterfeiters can obtain online accounts with
e-commerce platforms using fabricated information is a glaring
weakness of today’s e-commerce marketplaces.117 This weakness
allows counterfeiters to easily circumvent identification requirements,
disappear at the first sign of trouble, and reappear under a new name
and identity. This weakness creates a never-ending cat and mouse game
in which the counterfeiter has perpetual opportunities to reemerge on
the same or different websites protected by the anonymity of the
internet and the ability to escape detection by disappearing into the
vastness of cyberspace. Even when brand owners endure the misery of
using cumbersome NTDs to take down illegal listings, they find these
efforts are futile to stem the tide of counterfeiting on e-commerce
sites.118
IV. USING CHINA’S ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW AND RELATED LEGISLATION
While brand owners have concentrated their efforts on improving
NTDs, to date brand owners have not, to this Author’s knowledge, used
China’s recently enacted laws and regulations meant to control and limit
counterfeiting on the internet.
As China is the epicenter of
counterfeiting, using China’s relevant laws and regulations should
create an effective deterrent to counterfeiting on the internet not only
on Alibaba, China’s largest e-commerce site, but also on Amazon and
other U.S.-based sites that are being flooded by counterfeits originating
in China.119
A. The PRC Electronic Commerce Law
In 2019, China implemented the Electronic Commerce Law (“ECL”)
to strengthen government regulation of e-commerce.120 The basic
Id.
Id.
117 See COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS, supra note 1, at 22.
118 Bercovici, supra note 86.
119 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEITING AND PIRATED
GOODS (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0124_plcy_
counterfeit-pirated-goods-report_01.pdf (“Counterfeit and pirated products come from
many economies, with China appearing as the single largest producing market.”).
120 PRC Electronic Commerce Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019), 2019 (China) [hereinafter ECL]; see
id., art. 1 (“In order to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all subjects
115
116
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approach of the ECL is to impose a strict and tightly regulated system of
government supervised approval and registration requirements that
must be satisfied before any merchant can be allowed to operate on any
e-commerce platform.121 The drafters of the ECL believed that the
critical point in time is the point of entry to the e-commerce
marketplace.122 Therefore, they treat the point of entry as critical by
imposing strict entry requirements, which has created an effective
“choke point” to exclude vendors of counterfeit goods and other
unscrupulous sellers.123 The ECL, and other legal regulations, further
discussed below, must also be viewed in the larger context of China’s
overall goal of closely monitoring and supervising every aspect of their
industrial, commercial, and social spheres.124 This overall effort is part
of the Chinese Communist Party’s recent efforts to strengthen its
dominance and control over all aspects of Chinese society.125 Today,
China has an advanced and pervasive system of social controls that
brand owners can use to their advantage in the fight against
counterfeiting on the internet.126
involved in electronic commerce, regulate e-commerce practices, maintain the sound
market order and foster the development of the e-commerce industry in a sustainable
and healthy manner, the E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter
referred to as this “Law”) is formulated.”); art. 7 (“The State has developed a
collaborative administration system that conforms to the characteristics of the ecommerce sector, and pushes for forming a governance framework for the e-commerce
market within which related departments, industrial organizations for the e- commerce
industry, e-commerce operators and consumers join to govern this market.”).
121 Id. ch. II, arts. 9–25.
122 Id. arts. 10, 12.
123 See, e.g., id. arts. 10, 12, 15.
124 Anna Mitchell & Larry Diamond, China’s Surveillance State Should Scare Everyone,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/
02/china-surveillance/552203/.
125 Liza Lin, China Targets News Media in Xi Jinping’s Campaign to Expand Communist
Party Control, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2021, 11:55 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
china-targets-news-media-in-xi-jinpings-campaign-to-expand-communist-partycontrol-11634054123.
126 China has been particularly focused on closely monitoring the activities of areas
in western China inhabited by Uyghurs, an ethnic minority, and has created what some
have called a twenty-first century perfect police state to suppress resistance. Sebastian
Strangio, Geoffrey Cain on Xinjiang’s Perfect Police State, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 24, 2021),
https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/geoffrey-cain-on-xinjiangs-perfect-police-state/
(stating that “every person in Xinjiang is documented down to their genetic makeup, the
sound of their voice, and whether they enter their homes through the front or back
door”). As part of the Communist Party’s expanded control, China recently implemented
a “social credit system” that creates moral rankings of behaviors of its entire population,
companies, and government organizations. Bad habits, such as having too much debt,
can result in a lower score in the social ranking system, resulting in sanctions, such as
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The ECL applies to all natural or legal persons who are “ecommerce operators,” i.e., persons or entities that use the internet or ecommerce to sell goods or services.127 Article 2 of the ECL further
provides that “‘e-commerce’ refers to business activities conducted on
an information network, such as the Internet, to sell commodities or
offer services.”128 ECL Articles 10, 15 and 27 set forth certain
registration requirements:
Article 10
E-commerce operators shall register themselves as market
subjects according to the law . . . [except for] odd smallamount transaction activities that do not require any license
under the law, and other circumstances under which no registration is required under laws and administrative regulations.129
Article 12
Where business activities conducted by e-commerce operators are subject to the relevant administrative approval as required under the law, they shall obtain the administrative
license in accordance with the law.130
Article 27
An operator of an e-commerce platform shall require business
operators that apply to sell commodities or provide services
on its platform to submit truthful information, including the
identity, address, contact and administrative license, verify
and register such information, establish registration archives,
and have them verified and updated regularly.131
These provisions require all e-commerce business operators (i.e.,
vendors who sells products on e-commerce sites) to obtain
administrative licenses and submit the licenses and other truthful
being banned from airline travel. Katie Canales, China’s ‘Social Credit’ System Ranks
Citizens and Punishes Them with Throttled Internet Speeds and Flight Bans if the
Communist Party Deems Them Untrustworthy, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 24, 2021, 11:00 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-social-credit-system-punishments-andrewards-explained-2018-4.
127 ECL, supra note 120, art. 9.
128 Id. art. 2.
129 Id. art. 10. Also excepted are “individuals selling self-produced agricultural and
sideline products, or family handicrafts, individuals taking advantage of their own skills
to engage in labor activities for the convenience of people.” Id.
130 Id. art. 12.
131 Id. art. 27.

CHOW (DO NOT DELETE)

1074

4/20/22 9:37 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1053

information to the operator of an e-commerce platform, such as Alibaba.
These conditions must be satisfied before the business operator can
lawfully sell goods or services through the e-commerce platform.
Article 15 of the ECL also requires that the business operator display its
business license on its homepage:
Any e-commerce operator shall always have information
about its own business license, the administrative license issues for its business, and its status as a party that is not required to register itself as a market subject according to the
provisions of Article 10 herein, or the link to a webpage with
such information, published in a prominent position on its
homepage.132
B. Business License
The reference in ECL Articles 10 and 15 to administrative approval
refers to matters governed by the Administrative Regulations of the PRC
on the Registration of Enterprise Legal Persons (“AREP”). The AREP
was most recently revised in 2016.133 Article 3 of the AREP provides:
When an application for the registration of enterprise legal
person status has been examined and granted by the competent authority for the registration of enterprise legal persons,
the applicant shall obtain a Business License for Enterprise
Legal Person and a legal person status, and its lawful rights
and interest shall be protected by the law.134
The “competent authorities” in charge of the registration mentioned in
AREP Article 3, is the State Administration of Market Regulation
(“SAMR”) at the central level, and the Administrations of Market
Regulation (“AMRs”) at the local level.135 Until recently, the SAMR was
known as the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”)
and the local entities were known as AICs.136 The role of the SAMR is to
regulate and promote commercial activity within China’s internal

Id. art. 15.
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the
Registration of Enterprise Legal Persons (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 8, 2011,
effective Feb. 6, 2016) CLI.2.267123(EN) [hereinafter AREP].
134 AREP, supra note 133, art. 3.
135 The official website of the “SAMR” is available at https://www.samr.gov.cn/. The
site is written in the Chinese language with no official English translation available.
136 Interview with Wu Zhenguo, Dir. Gen., Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the State
Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), People’s Republic of China (May 2021).
See Jingyuan Mao, Competition Law in China: A Law and Economics Perspective 168–72
(2020); Chow, Barriers to Criminal Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in China, supra
note 37, at 8.
132
133
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market.137 One SAMR’s major tasks is to create and administer a
registration system for trademarks.138 Under PRC law, the SAMR is the
entity charged with the primary role of protecting trademarks,139 as well
as a gatekeeper for all business entities that wish to lawfully operate in
China’s internal market.140 Under Article 3 of the AREP and Article 212
of the PRC Company Law, no business entity without a business license
issued by the ARMs can lawfully operate.141
C. Deterrence Created by ECL and AREP
To obtain a business license, AREP requires that the applicant
satisfy a review and approval process by the ARMs.142 At the end of the
process, if all requirements are met, the ARMs will issue the business
license.143 As a basic requirement, the applicant must submit a
certificate of approval for the business entity by the department in
charge of the industrial sector.144 China divides all industrial sectors of
the economy into vertical sectors under the control of a supervisory
137 U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL [USCBC], State Administration for Market Regulation, at 1
(May
2021),
https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/samr_organization_
chart.pdf.
138 Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Apr. 23, 2019, effective Nov. 11, 2019), art. 2, 2019. Article
2 refers to the administrative authority as the administration department for industry
and commerce (“AICs”), but the AICs have been replaced by the AMRs. For
administration by the AMRs, see ch. III, arts. 28–38.
139 See id. art. 2.
140 See U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, supra note 137.
141 AREP, supra note 133, art. 16 (“Where an entity files an application for
registration for the commencement of business as an enterprise legal person, upon
being approved and registered by the competent registration authority and granted a
Business License . . . the enterprise is established.”); Company Law (promulgated by the
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, rev’d Oct. 26, 2018), art. 7,
2018 P.R.C. LAWS (China) (“Company registration authorities shall issue business
licenses of companies to the companies established under the law. The date of
issuance of a business license for a company shall be the date of establishment of the
company.”). See also Marteen Beekers, How to Verify a China Business License in 5
Steps, CHINATRADEBLOG (Jan. 11, 2019), https://chinatradeblog.org/china-businesslicense-verification/ (“Each business license . . . is an official certificate, that proves
that a Chinese company has been registered with the authorities and operates
legally”). The “competent authorities in charge of company registration are the AICs,
see AREP Art. 4, now replaced by the ARMs. See Chow, Barriers to Criminal
Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in China, supra note 37.
142 AREP, supra note 133, art. 3. The “competent authority” is now the ARMs, which
has replaced the AICs.
143 AREP, supra note 133, art. 16.
144 DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL
381 (2d ed. 2009).
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authority.145 For example, a business entity that wishes to establish a
factory to manufacture laundry detergent must first submit an
economic feasibility study to obtain permission from the Ministry of
Light Industry or its local counterpart.146 Only after a certificate of
approval from the supervisory authority for a particular industry sector
has been obtained can the applicant then obtain a business license from
the ARMs.147
The provisions of the AREP set forth in detail the documents that
must be submitted to obtain a business license. In addition to the
certificate of approval from the applicant’s supervisory authority, the
applicant must submit its articles of association, a certificate of
creditworthiness, a verification of capital, a certificate of the identity of
the legal representative of the enterprise, and a certificate of a right to
use its domicile and place of business.148 A vendor of trademarked
goods must submit a trademark registration or a licensing agreement as
proof of its lawful authority to use the trademark to sell the goods.149
This last requirement should deter many counterfeiters from obtaining
business licenses from the ARMs.150

Id.
Economic feasibility means that the enterprise will have enough assets and
personnel to achieve its purposed goals. See AREP, supra note 133, art. 7 (“Any entity
that applies to be registered as an enterprise legal person must satisfy the following
requirements . . . the entity has funds and employees in conformity with State
regulations and in line with its scale of production, operation, or service.”).
147 Id. art. 15(2) (requiring document of approval from supervisory authority).
148 Id. art. 15.
149 Id. (“other relevant documents and certificates”).
150 Counterfeiters, however, can work around this rule. A business entity might have
a trademark certificate for one product but, once it receives a business license and opens
an account with an e-commerce platform, the entity might begin to sell counterfeiting
or infringing products under a different trademark, for which it does not have a
certificate or a license agreement. If this occurs, the online merchant has operated
outside the lawful scope of its business license, which only authorizes the sales of the
product for which the online merchant has a trademark certificate. See id. art. 13 (“An
enterprise legal shall engage in business activities within such scope of business as is
approved and registered.”). The sanction for operating outside the scope of the business
license is a fine and cancellation of the business license. Id. art. 29(2) (providing that a
business license can be canceled where “the enterprise carries out business activities
beyond such scope as is approved and registered”); see also id. art. 29 (stating that a
business license canceled “[w]here the enterprise carries out any illegal business
activities”). The brand owner whose products were counterfeited can notify the AMRs,
and the AMRs can enter sanctions against the offending business entity, including
cancellation of the business license. Id. art. 29. The brand owner can also proceed
directly against the legal representative of the business entity. See infra Section IV.D.
145
146

CHOW (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

INTERNET SALES OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS

4/20/22 9:38 AM

1077

Once the business license has been issued, the business entity must
have an official seal or chop made.151 These seals are not a mere
formality; seals replace signatures in China.152 After the seal is made,
the seal must be registered with the ARMs, the Public Security Bureau
(China’s police), and the business entity’s bank.153 All of the company’s
documents must be stamped with its seal to be legally effective.154 A
signature by a company official alone is not sufficient.
These requirements create a significant deterrent and, in all
likelihood, an insuperable barrier for counterfeiters to overcome. Most
counterfeiters will not be able to satisfy the requirements to obtain a
business license, and most counterfeiters will not even attempt to apply
for a business license due to the likelihood that their conduct will attract
the attention of PRC enforcement authorities, such as the Public Security
Bureau, China’s police. Most counterfeiters do not operate legitimate
businesses that can satisfy the requirements of the AREP.155
D. Direct Recourse against the Counterfeiter
The previous Section discussed the deterrent effects of complying
with the ECL and AREP and showed that illegal underground factories
operated by most counterfeiters cannot satisfy the requirements of the
ECL and AREP to register and obtain the necessary business licenses.
But there is another advantage created by the ECL and AREP for brand
owners. The ECL and AREP allow brand owners to proceed directly
against infringers and counterfeiters, and pass-by the NTDs established
by e-commerce platforms.
151 AREP, supra note 133, art. 16; see also Claudia Ramadori, What Are Company
Chops in China and How to Use Them, NEW HORIZON GLOB. PERSPS. (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://nhglobalpartners.com/company-chops-in-china-how-to-use/.
152 See Ramadori, supra note 151.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 For example, Article 7 of the AREP provides:
Any entity that applies to be registered as an enterprise legal person must
satisfy the following requirements:
1. the entity has its name, organizational structure and articles of
association;
2. the entity has a fixed place of business and essential facilities;
3. the entity has funds and employees in conformity with State regulations
and in line with its scale of production, operation or service;
4. the entity is able to bear civil liabilities independently; and
5. the entity has a scope of business in conformity with the provisions of
the relevant laws, regulations and policies of the State.
It is highly unlikely that a counterfeiter will be able to satisfy requirements three or five
of article 7.
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Suppose that a legitimate business entity, who has complied with
the ECL and AREP registration and licensing requirements, opens an
online account and then decides to sell counterfeits. Or in what is a more
likely scenario, the registered business entity produces a product that
partially copies a trademark of a brand owner and sells it on an ecommerce marketplace. The registered business entity may not be
necessarily acting in bad faith, but has nevertheless infringed upon a
trademark owned by a U.S. brand owner.
Under the ECL, the business operator is required to display its
business license information in a prominent place on its homepage.156
Once the U.S. brand owner obtains the license identification number, the
brand owner is able to obtain detailed information contained in the
business license through publicly available websites, such as the
Enterprise Credit Information System.157 Among the information
available through public websites is the address of the business entity
that has been verified by the ARMs, and the name of the legal
representative.158 Every PRC citizen is issued a unique national
identification number.159 Persons identified with this number by the
authorities find it difficult to evade detection and capture by authorities.
With this identification number, PRC authorities will be able to track
down the address, bank information, and relatives of the individual.160
The concept of the legal representative under PRC finds no direct
counterpart in U.S. law. The legal representative is designated by law as
the natural person who has authority to bind the company.161 PRC
lawmakers wanted to ensure that there was one designated person with
clear authority to sign binding contracts on behalf of the company or
ECL, supra note 120, art. 15.
AREP, supra note 133, art. 23 (“Competent registration authorities shall publicize
the registration-related information and information for record-filing purposes of
enterprise legal persons to society through the enterprise credit information publicity
system.”).
158 See, e.g., NATIONAL ENTERPRISE CREDIT INFORMATION PUBLICITY SYSTEM, REPORT ON
ZHENGTONG INVESTMENT COMPANY 2 (Sept. 20, 2021) (copy on file with Seton Hall Law
Review).
159 All Chinese citizens have a permanent 18-digit identification number. Knowing a
citizen’s number will allow access to their information, such as the person’s date of birth,
place of birth, and gender. All PRC citizens are also required to carry a Resident Identity
Card that carries additional information, such as the person’s permanent address. See
Matt Slater, China ID Card – An Introduction, CHINA CHECKUP (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.chinacheckup.com/blog/china-id-card.
160 This observation is based on this Author’s own experience working in China.
161 AREP, supra note 133, art. 11 (“The legal representative of an enterprise legal
person . . . shall be the signatory who exercises functions and powers on behalf of the
enterprise.”).
156
157
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otherwise legally bind the company with his or her actions.162 PRC
lawmakers also wanted to ensure that there was a natural person who
would bear civil and criminal liability for the acts of the business entity
and that ultimate liability did not rest with a legal fiction.163 Article 49
of the PRC General Principles of the Civil Law provides:
Under any of the following circumstances, an enterprise as legal person shall bear liability, its legal representative may additionally be given administrative sanctions and fined and, if
the offence constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility shall
be investigated in accordance with the law:
(1) conducting illegal operations beyond the range approved and registered by the registration authority;
(2) concealing facts from the registration and tax authorities and practicing fraud;
(3) secretly withdrawing funds or hiding property to
evade repayment of debts;
(4) disposing of property without authorization after the
enterprise is dissolved, disbanded or declared bankrupt;
(5) failing to apply for registration and make a public announcement promptly when the enterprise undergoes a
change or terminates, thus causing interested persons to
suffer heavy losses;
(6) engaging in other activities prohibited by law, damaging the interests of the State or the public interest.164
As Article 49 indicates, the legal representative in its personal capacity
is concurrently liable for the illegal acts committed on behalf of the
enterprise. If the enterprise sells counterfeit goods, the legal
representative can be held personally liable under both civil and
criminal law.165 The brand owner can proceed directly against an
identified natural person and is not relegated to suing a business entity.

See id.
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2009) art. 49, 2009 P.R.C. LAWS
(China) (repealed 2021) [hereinafter GPCL].
164 Id. The General Principles of the Civil Law were repealed by the new PRC Civil
Code, which went into effect as of January 1, 2021. The Civil Code does not appear to
have an equivalent provision to Article 49 of the GCPL. Despite this, most PRC Law
experts believe that this is an apparent oversight and does not change the legal liability
of the legal representative. Moreover, experts believe that GPCL Article 49 still provides
a good set of guidelines for liability, and they even continue to refer to Article 49 of the
GPCL post January 1, 2021. See, e.g., Understanding the Role of a Legal Representative in
China, INTEGRA GRP., https://www.integra-group.cn/role-of-legal-representative-inchina/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
165 GCPL, supra note 163, art. 49.
162
163
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A U.S. brand owner who finds counterfeit or infringing products on
an e-commerce site following the ECL regulations can immediately
identify the legal representative, a natural legal person, through
required information on the homepage of the vendor.166 The brand
owner can proceed directly against the legal representative by sending
a cease and desist letter or by naming the legal representative in a
lawsuit filed in China or in the United States, assuming jurisdictional
requirements are met. The brand owner can either by-pass the use of
the NTD altogether or use the NTD in conjunction with taking direct
steps against the legal representative of the counterfeiter or infringer.
E-commerce platforms in China are required to follow the ECL.
Nothing prevents U.S.-based e-commerce platforms such as Amazon or
eBay from requiring China-based merchants to follow the ECL. In fact,
requiring Chinese merchants to comply with the ECL is the best method
for ensuring that the Chinese merchant is a lawfully constituted,
legitimate, and viable business entity in China. The U.S.-based ecommerce platform has the assurance of knowing that any Chinese
merchant who satisfies the ECL has successfully completed multiple
layers of official reviews and approval by PRC authorities. Moreover,
U.S.-based e-commerce platforms can require by contract that all Chinabased merchants comply with the ECL and other related laws.
E-commerce platforms can also include a dispute resolution clause
in their contracts that requires the legal representative to submit to
binding arbitration or litigation in China or the United States. Such a
clause will allow brand owners to proceed directly and immediately
against an identified natural person if counterfeits or infringing goods
are found on a listing.
E. Lax Enforcement of the ECL
Although the ECL is a mandatory law, the ECL is still a relatively
new law and does not have a high level of compliance. For example,
some Chinese e-commerce platforms, such as Alibaba, currently do not
faithfully follow its regulations.167 An examination of the homepage of
Chinese merchants selling their products on Alibaba reveals that these

166 ECL, supra note 120, art. 15 (requiring display of business license). The name of
the company’s legal representative is set forth in its business license. See supra note
155.
167 STATE ADMIN. OF INDUS. & COMMERCE, WHITE PAPER ON ALIBABA GROUP HOLDINGS
ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE WORK SITUATION (Jan. 28, 2015), https://qz.com/335675/thechinese-govermnent-has-erased-a-damning-report-on-alibaba-but-you-can-read-ithere/ [hereinafter SAIC WHITE PAPER] (A complete copy of the SAIC White Paper is on file
with the Seton Hall Law Review).
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homepages do not display the merchants’ business licenses as required
by ECL Article 15.168 The PRC government has criticized Alibaba for only
paying “lip service” to verifying information and for being careless in its
examination of business licenses.169 Alibaba has been found to accept
bribes from Chinese online merchants, and it is possible that this
practice is being used to evade registration requirements of the ECL.170
Amazon does not require Chinese business operators to comply with the
ECL, AREP, or other provisions of PRC law,171 but allows merchants to
set up an Amazon account using totally fictitious information.172 Failure
to comply with the ECL by companies such as Alibaba and Amazon
allows counterfeiters and other unscrupulous sellers to easily
circumvent legal requirements and to open accounts with internet
platforms using false information.
V. CONCLUSION
The PRC currently provides the tools designed for brand owners to
combat counterfeiting on the internet. The ECL, AREP, and other laws
were designed by PRC law-makers to create rigorous requirements that
only legitimate and viable business entities can fulfill. The application
of these laws should deter counterfeiters, most of who operate illegal
underground factories, from obtaining the necessary legal approvals to
operate lawfully on e-commerce sites. Counterfeiters and other
criminals in China seek to operate clandestinely and are typically
protected by disguises, false identities, and fictitious locations. The ECL,
AREP, and other PRC laws are designed to create transparency and
This Author recently examined numerous webpages on the Chinese language
website of Taobao, an Alibaba subsidiary. No merchant displayed a business license.
For example, Amazing Song, a seller of women’s handbags, did not display its merchant’s
business license. See TAOBAO, Amazing Song, https://detail.tmall.com/item.htm?spm=
a211oj.23070166.7913690490.d3.7bc35215bTawg0&id=638691799579&scm=1007.
12144.215053.17591495_0_0&pvid=8be6870c-728c-467d-a5c62fddb8980157&utparam=%7B%22x_hestia_source%22:%22tm_fen_floor%22,%22x_
object_type%22:%22item%22,%22x_hestia_subsource%22:%22default%22,%22x_mt
%22:8,%22x_src%22:%22tm_fen_floor%22,%22x_pos%22:4,%22wh_pid%22:242647
,%22x_pvid%22:%228be6870c-728c-467d-a5c62fddb8980157%22,%22scm%22:%221007.12144.215053.17591495_0_0%22,%22x_
object_id%22:638691799579,%22tpp_buckets%22:%222144#0#215053#0%22%7D
(last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
169 See SAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 167.
170 Id.
171 Amazon’s policies and rules of conduct do not make any mention of these laws.
See AMAZON, Selling Policies and Sellers’ Code of Conduct, https://sellercentral.
amazon.com/gp/help/external/G1801?language=en_US (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
172 See SEMUELS, supra note 115.
168
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accountability, which are requirements that counterfeiters both loath
and fear.
The ECL and AREP can be a benefit to U.S. brand owners in two
distinct, but related ways. First, the ECL, AREP, and other laws can
create an effective barrier to counterfeiters opening online accounts on
China-based e-commerce platforms, such as Alibaba. U.S.-based ecommerce platforms can require as a matter of contract, that Chinese
merchants comply with the ECL, AREP, and all applicable PRC laws.
Such a requirement would be a significant improvement over the
current situation in which operators can gain access to e-commerce
sites using totally fictitious information. Second, the ECL, AREP and
other PRC laws will allow U.S. brand owners to proceed directly against
the legal representative of the counterfeiter without the need to first
obtain the cooperation of a U.S-based e-commerce platform. All the
information necessary to pursue the counterfeiter directly is required
by the ECL to be on the homepage of the suspected counterfeiter. Being
able to proceed directly against the counterfeiter will spare the brand
owner the misery of having to use cumbersome NTDs, which are now
required by some U.S.-based e-commerce sites. Of course, the brand
owner can proceed simultaneously against the counterfeiter and use the
NTDs.
The benefits of the ECL will redound to brand owners, however,
only if the ECL is rigorously enforced. Some e-commerce sites in China
are known to apply lax requirements for obtaining and maintaining an
online account, which is in direct contravention of the ECL. Such lax
attention paid to legal requirements by some business entities is not
uncommon in China’s current business culture that is riddled with many
forms of petty corruption.173 For example, the PRC government has
reported incidents of applicants for online accounts making payments
to managers at e-commerce sites in exchange for favorable treatment.174
E-commerce sites in the United States have ignored the ECL and are in
favor of simplifying NTDs instead. E-commerce sites based in China and
the United States might not have the strongest incentive to rigorously
enforce the ECL, as reducing counterfeits would also diminish their sales
and their revenue, a suspicion that brand owners have long held about
e-commerce sites.
Brand owners are the parties that have the greatest incentive to
promote rigorous enforcement of the ECL. Yet, curiously, they have not
attempted to induce PRC authorities to step up enforcement of the ECL
Daniel C.K. Chow, Cultural Barriers to Effective Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices in China, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 551, 552 (2017).
174 See SAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 167.
173
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and related laws. Rather, brand owners have concentrated on inducing
e-commerce sites to simplify their NTDs. Simplifying and improving
NTDs, however, only offers a partial solution and has serious limitations.
Perhaps brand owners are wary of relying on PRC authorities because
that is unfamiliar terrain as opposed to the comfort of pleading with
U.S.-based e-commerce sites. Yet, brand owners, not e-commerce
platforms, appear to have the greatest incentive to induce rigorous
enforcement of the ECL. Whether PRC authorities will be responsive to
lobbying by brand owners for full enforcement of ECL is yet to be seen.
But enacting the ECL is a part of the Communist Party’s overall efforts
to strengthen its control of the internet, which is one of China’s most
important segments of industry. The ECL is also part of a far-reaching
Party initiative for increasing its supervision of all business and social
activities in China.
U.S. brand owners must understand that compliance with the ECL
and related laws is the best way to ensure that an online merchant is a
lawfully constituted and legitimate business entity in China. Seeking
compliance with the ECL would also be consistent with traditional
concepts of choice of law, which provides that the law of the place in
which a business entity is organized should be applied to determine the
legality of a business entity.175 Brand owners should realize that
rigorous enforcement of the ECL and related laws should result in a
noticeable deterrent effect on counterfeits sold on China-based and U.S.based e-commerce marketplace sites.

175 See
Corporations, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
corporations (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (“A corporation is a legal entity created through
the laws of the state of its incorporation.”).

